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Abstract
We argue that an infinite universe should not necessarily be avoided
on philosophical grounds. Paradoxes of repeating behaviour in the in-
finite, or eternal inflationary, universe can be alleviated by a realistic
definition of differing lives: not simply permutations of various quan-
tum states. The super-exponential growth in the rules of a cellular
automata is used as an example of surpassing the holography bound.
We also critically question the notion that our universe could sim-
ply be a simulation in somebody else’s computer.
PACS numbers: 04.20.Gz, 98.80.-k
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Introduction
There is much discussion about the topology of the universe, most re-
cently a closed compact Dodecahedral shaped universe has been claimed to
be consistent with the latest WMAP data [1]. Previously, there was interest
in compact open universes - for general reviews on topology of the universe
see [2].
For a while in cosmology there has been a prejudice against infinite uni-
verses since they apparently give the paradoxical situation that there must
also be other identical planets and life to ours. Assuming the Copernican
principle that our observable part of the universe is not unusual, this is pos-
sible in a open or flat FRW universe [3] or if an infinite number of finite
closed universes are created [4] as in the eternal chaotic universe scenario
[5]. One might first wonder if similar life, beyond the particle horizon in
our universe, is more disconcerting than identical life in other totally dis-
connected universes. For this reason many cosmologists prefer the idea of a
bound universe to try to prevent such worrisome “clones of themselves” liv-
ing elsewhere in the universe. As we later remark this would not anyway be
a satisfactory situation; it implies that all possible human endeavor is finite
but by restricting to a subset we never have to be aware of this limitation.
The only real consideration is that we should be in a low entropy state as
any activity will cause entropy increase. But while in such a state we are
effectively isolated thermodynamically from the rest of the universe.
Although, we have doubts as to whether certain eternal universe schemes
are viable we wish to argue that this sort of infinity is not so frightening as of-
ten suspected. Because our environment at our instigation can be extremely
complex there seems little chance of a life actually repeating the same his-
toric path, despite an apparent finite number of possible quantum states. We
shall try and argue for a no-repeat condition for life in the universe. This is
independent of global thermodynamical properties of the universe. We shall
use a single cellular automata to illustrate how the holography bound can be
circumvented. Although the finite number of states of a cellular automata
means that it alone is not sufficient to totally prevent a no-repeat condi-
tion, it does illustrate limitations in how the holography principle has been
interpreted.
Some related argument can be made against the notion that we are merely
the result of somebody’s computer simulation [6]. Such a computer simula-
tion also has problems with maintaining the notion of free will for life within
the simulation.
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Although this debate might seem rather abstract spurious philosophical
notions seem to have been suggested from such examples. The infinite uni-
verse is said to include somewhere “every possible action you choose NOT to
perform” [7] . Likewise in the computer simulation our actions are merely to
“amuse others” and so in either case, we are not really under any compunc-
tion to modify our behaviour [8].
State counting is insufficient
It is easy to formulate a puzzle with more permutations than particles
in the universe ∼ 1080. For example a travelling salesman with N places
to visit has N ! possible routes. So N ∼ 100 routes can surpass this ∼ 1080
figure. One can say that the complexity of our environment is not limited by
this particle number figure, since anyway why should the actual number of
particles vastly distant from us limit what is or isn’t possible for us on earth.
Now if we consider the number of possible quantum states within the
observable universe, which is the essence of the repeat argument[4,9], we
obtain a much larger figure X ∼ 1010
120
. This is obtained by applying a
holography type principle to the universe. According to Rucker [10], who
argues against this sort of reasoning, E. Wette first obtained ∼ 1010
10
possible
space-time states. The actual figure is not crucial for our argument. Now
is this figure anymore relevant than the previous number in limiting the
complexity of our lives? Although, a game like Chess or Go does not have this
many game permutations [11] I again can surpass this figure by considering
a more elaborate puzzle: actually by means of cellular automata - see [12]
for a full description.
For a block cellular automata with blocks of size n and allowing k colours
there are knk
n
rules or “games to play”, before we worry about the number
of ways of playing each game [12]. So for say size 1000 blocks and ten colours
I again can surpass this large figure apparently imposed by the holography
argument. The large number of quantum states does not constrain the extra
patterns that we might explore even for relatively few atoms involved in
such a cellular automata. Note also that actual information is equal to the
logarithm, to base 2, of the number of possible quantum states. So the visible
universe can only store ∼ 10120 bits of information with this many quantum
states. This fact will later be useful in understanding the actual relevance of
the holography bound.
What possible maximum number of rules, say Y , that could be explored
on a physically realistic computers is unknown but will in effect be almost
infinite, in comparison with the earlier apparent large number of quantum
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states i.e. Y >> X . Such complexity is probably existing already in nature,
for example patterns on cone shells [12].
But is this sufficient complexity to remedy recurrence occurring? Af-
ter all without an infinite grid the number of permutations Y is still finite
and repeats would still eventually occur. But by surpassing the holography
bound there is now no known reason to believe the number of possibilities is
actually finite. So the resolution of the problem is currently unknown. How-
ever, I think there is strong evidence to suppose that the quantum universe
should not be simpler than a classical one. Recall, if I considered the number
of possible football games and there was no limit to how accurately I could
measure the position of the players and ball I would obtain ℵ1 possible games.
The same cardinality as all the points within a 4-dimensional box, whether
finite or infinite sized - see e.g.[10]. So in such a classical universe any clones
do not play exactly the same game regardless of whether the universe is fi-
nite or infinite. Ordinary quantum mechanics does not alter this since the
underlying modes are still continuous, although such modes are often made
of discrete quanta. In many ways the quantum version is more complicated
since Uncertainty Principles are only limits on complementary measurements
while from Bell’s inequality type arguments we know there is not even an
“underlying reality of the universe” - see e.g. [13]. Indeed, quantum mechan-
ics allows randomness to remain even when a measurement has been made.
This process itself is rather analogue in that continuous differing directions
can be chosen for the measurement of say the polarization of photons. As
emphasized recently by Hawking [14] in his so called top-down approach to
cosmology, there is no observer independent history to the universe. Rather
our measurements determine what histories have dominated in a Feynman
path integral for the state of the universe.
Whether quantum gravity will eventually show that space comes in pack-
ets or is continuous should not significantly detract from the above reasoning
unless quantum mechanics is itself simplified by the ultimate quantum gravity
theory. Presently there still seems many uncertainties in reconciling quan-
tum mechanical notions with discreteness at the Planck scale cf. information
loss [15]. Incidentally if there is such discreteness and space-time comes in
packets then the infinite universe has at most size ℵ0 packets.
In conclusion, the actual complexity of our environment although not
precisely known is not simply limited by the number of particle states within
the universe.
Does Eternal inflation give infinite space?
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We have previously give a number of possible reasons why the eternal in-
flationary mechanism might not hold [16,17] . These include a) The adaption
of the Hawking radiation calculation, derived from Black hole physics, to de
Sitter space not being entirely correct-see [18] for some differences between
the two cases. This might alter the fluctuation result required for galaxy
formation. b) Black holes or other topological defects being produced that
reduce the surface gravity and so the perturbation strength. Especially since
the Planck scale might be altered in Brane models. c) Higher dimensions
becoming relevant that likewise reduce the surface gravity of de Sitter space.
In Brane models the continual presence of a fixed higher dimensional bulk
AdS space could constrain the process cf.[19]. Large gravitational wave fluc-
tuations from presently inflating regions might take “short cuts” through
the bulk space and over produce matter perturbations in our region of the
Brane, or give a large dark radiation term. d) The required superposition
of quantum modes being prevented by a decoherence mechanism cf.[13]. e)
The quantum fluctuations of matter not automatically being transferred to
the geometric left hand side of Einstein’s equation. f) The imposition of the
2nd law of thermodynamics preventing decrease in entropy within any hori-
zon volumes- related to the decoherence mechanism if many other particle
modes are present. Other issues have been emphasized by Turok [20].
We will anyway for now allow the eternal mechanism the benefit of the
doubt on these sort of issues. However more seriously in this regard some
geodesic incompleteness results for expanding universes suggests that infla-
tion has only been occurring for a finite time [21] . So if the initial domain
was a closed compact space only finite numbers of new closed universes can
be obtained. It follows from only so many new Hubble sized domains per
unit time being formed. Actually even with infinite time being available only
ℵ0 universes would be formed. Note that this argument is similar to one for
particle creation numbers in a steady state universe [10]. There is also a
“new inflationary” eternal scheme [22] where the universe remains globally
de Sitter but fluctuations cause local FRW universes to condense out. Again
the finiteness or not depends on the geometry of the background which is an
ab initio input.
There is yet another variation on this scheme, involving quantum tun-
nelling, where open universes can occur [23]. From within such a universe
the universe appears infinite in size like an open FRW universe. However,
there is some slight of hand with this argument as observers outside this
bubble would still think it is of finite but growing size. Also since the time
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Figure 1: An open FRW universe being created in de Sitter space. Because
the external time t is geodesically incomplete to the past, a constant time τ
surface within the bubble is only actually infinite as t→∞.
outside the bubble is limited by the geodesic incompleteness results, and so
cannot be taken to infinity, the full Penrose diagram of the open universe is
not strictly valid - see Fig.(1). We therefore do not think that the eternal
universe mechanism can actually give an infinite total size universe if the
original domain was finite - this claim suffers from a lack of gauge invariance.
It cannot actually change finite to infinite because of the geodesic incom-
pleteness restriction. One might start with an initially infinite domain but
then the eternal inflationary mechanism doesn’t per se cause this infinity.
But again for the sake of argument lets still assume open FRW universe can
be formed.
Real life complexity
The archetypal infinite universe is still then just the flat or open FRW
universe case [3]; also present in the pre-big bang model if the initial state
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is infinite [24] . By means of a single cellular automata we have given an
example that allows more rules to explore than are apparently allowed by an
holography argument for the number of quantum states. This alone pushes
repeat lives vastly further away than previously expected by quantum state
considerations. If cellular automata are a realistic representation of nature
we can speculate that in our actual lives we are, at least, playing many
cellular automata in parallel. Even this is probably a vast underestimate since
quantum mechanics allows “non-local” effects whereas a cellular automata
has only nearest neighbour rules. We therefore suspect that the actual value
of Y will approach ℵ0. If so then unless the size of the universe was some
higher order infinity repeats would be absent.
In conclusion, it seem that even if possible identical lifeforms are present
in the infinite universe it can be argued that the complexity of the games
we play or simply “our lives” will fortunately not be being repeated. In
practice we play many complex games simultaneously and sequentially so the
total number of possible permutations astronomically grows towards what
can only be approximated by countable infinity ℵ0. There now seems little
difference between an infinite or finite universe in this regard. A definite
proof will require a more complete understanding of what possibly limits
the mathematical complexity we can interact with, and exactly how future
quantum gravity phenomena should be included.
Simulation of universe
Another extreme type of cosmology is that we are simply being simulated
in a computer in somebody else’s universe [6]. This is just the latest version
of a long standing idea in cosmology [25].
Bostrom [6] is concerned that if humans don’t become extinct they could
start simulating life on their machines and contribute excessively to the total
number of humans who have ever “lived”. We then are most likely if we are
a “typical observer” to be actually one of the lives in the machine.
This problem firstly concerns deep philosophical issues some of which are
closely related to those considered by Wittgenstein [26,27]. For example, if
nothing around us is then actually real; it is only some sort of “activity in
a structure” pretending to be just like our universe, how can we then know
anything concretely about the true universe? This argument is related to
some in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty [26] and concerns the difficulty of the
skeptic once all ground rules are done away with. Of course the simulation
exponents want to take notions gleaned from within our “false” universe to
understand the real universe - but this is a philosophical impasse.
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Let us think also about simulation. We do not have remotely realistic
computers to do this but we do have some understanding of the “computer”
in our heads which can simulate or imagine different events. Now a dream in
my mind is a simulation, but note that the characters in my dream do not
have true existence as far I am aware. There is therefore no essential need
for the “people” within this future simulation to actually exist in the sense of
self-conscious awareness. What the advocates of this scheme are suggesting
is therefore a more extreme “mind creation” device not a simple simulation.
The connection between a brain state and an actual understanding is also
more involved than suggested. On a practical ground there are estimated to
be roughly ∼ 1010
10
possible patterns within the brain [28,29]. The notion
of keeping track of these fragile states is not compatible with quantum me-
chanics, since observation alone would alter the states.
However, Wittgenstein’s “Philosophical investigations”[27] suggests that
without “direct contact” you cannot gain true understanding in your mind.
So these created minds must at some stage have interacted and learnt with
real things, that have some similarity to those in our world. There is a similar
reasoned example by Putnam [30] that if we were simply “brains in a vat”
being fed impulses we couldn’t refer outside the simulation. We could never
even imagine that we might be all just brains in a vat. The proponents of
the scheme don’t object to the universes being similar to some extent, but
we will later show that this seems incompatible with other considerations.
Although Wittgenstein is not the last word in philosophy: the notion that our
understanding, or theirs, is strongly grounded in your present world would
place great difficulty in anybody actually simulating or understanding what
was happening in a totally different world.
Returning to actual computers. If one takes a cellular automata [12]
then properties like self reproduction can occur. However this sort of scheme
doesn’t seem consistent with our notions of free will. If we instead have free
will the simulation cannot follow a deterministic procedure since it would
need to know our choices beforehand cf. Mackay’s argument [31,32] against
a pre-determined universe. This seems especially true in quantum mechanics
where even just the possibility of measurement can be important cf. de-
layed choice experiments using photons gravitationally lensed from across
the universe-see e.g.[13].
For cellular automata, as mentioned by Barrow [29,32], a threshold of
complexity occurs once self-reference is possible. At this stage a classical
paradox, like “the Liar’s”, can be described within the system and Go¨del
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like incompleteness is present. Barrow [33] has suggested errors in the com-
puter programming could be apparent in our universe since Go¨del incom-
pleteness has been shown to correspond to not knowing the shortest program
to produce a task. However, the physical universe might not require such an
elaborate algebra that contains incompleteness [32].
But if we consider the mathematical world this problem must be apparent.
In a simulation nothing is inherent and so everything has to be put there
explicitly. For example, there is an interesting problem, beyond current
computing capacity, involving the sign of Li(n) − pi(n) where Li(n) is the
logarithmic integral function and pi(n) the number of prime numbers less
than n. The value changes sign repeatedly for large arbitrary numbers -see
e.g. [34]. Storing its actual behaviour seems effectively impossible in any
physical system. But if the computer doing the simulation only works with
approximate algorithms we should be able to overwhelm it, if only by chance
we happen upon an improved algorithm. This is unlike the physical world
which might have completeness.
One might also worry about uncomputable problems in our universe and
how they can be taken care of. For a really astronomical number consider
the Busy Beaver problem with a 12 state Turing machine [35] and games
that might be formulated!
There are also results [36] that a computer within our universe cannot pro-
cesses information as fast as the universe, or solve every problem we might
consider. So if this result can be extended and applied to the universe in
which the simulation of our universe occurs we either a) have a much less so-
phisticated universe than they do or b) the evolution speed has been altered
to prevent this limitation appearing . The constants of nature would appar-
ently differ in our universe from theirs ( we must be running slower). A slower
evolving simulation of an inferior universe would not be very interesting to
the viewers.
We should also point out that since the computer cannot totally predict its
own universe it is still rather unprotected. Since the motivation of simulated
universes is to argue against Doomsday extinction, this computer still seems
exposed to unforseen danger cf.[6]. Especially if there is some sort of infinite
regress of simulations within simulations. A “power failure” in the primary
universe would take them all out. One would anyway expect some sort of
degradation due to simulation i.e. entropy rapidly building up in the initial
actually physical universe.
There must also be some constraint preventing us developing a more pow-
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erful computer than that doing the simulation - a rather spurious imposition.
If the universe is really made up of quantum gravity packets of space
cf. loop quantum gravity [37], then these cannot be compressed further. It
violates the quantum rules to define them more sharply. Either a) laws of
physics are different within the simulating machine or b) only a subset of
the states we think are in the visible universe are being modelled. Neither is
philosophically appealing.
We can see this problem more directly: recall the universe is made up of
X quantum states which can code information only of maximum logX , see
e.g. [38]. But if this is a simulation within some “computer ” it would take
at least 2X distinct states to simply note these states within the computer.
The information within the computer is therefore greater than that present
or ever achievable in the universe. The simulation is actually massively in-
efficient. Again one gets the conclusion that only a vastly inferior, by a two
logarithms amount, universe can be simulated. This is also related to the
underlying randomness inherent in quantum mechanics needing instead to
be accurately described within the simulating computer, i.e. the so-called
“hidden variables” are un-hidden in the simulator cf.[13]
Conclusions
By describing a cellular automata with Y possibilities we have obtained a
stronger constraint on the distance that you might encounter clones of oneself
having identical lives. But once the holography argument is surpassed we see
little evidence to further restrain the complexity that restricts our lives: on
the contrary quantum mechanics should actually mean the universe is more
complicated than a purely classical universe This might be too subjective for
some people since it depends on us defining structures and games that we
interact with to distinguish different lives.
Recall the archetypal issue is if all possible molecules for life like DNA
have finite variations then repeats happen. Incidentally, we suspect the way
the instructions are implemented allows vastly more variations depending
on chemical concentrations, background radiation etc, than often supposed.
Even then if clones do exist their differing food sources, environment etc.
will cause some divergences in their behaviour. However, our main point is
that our games or “culture” is so potentially elaborate that no repeats in
life history are realistically possible. Since genetic twins occur anyway upon
earth, and human cloning is nearly possible, this seems the only realistic form
of non-repetition we could achieve. An implication of this argument is that
whether the universe is finite or infinite becomes less consequential for the
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actual complexity of our lives. Only a bigger still infinity e.g. ℵ1 of universes,
that is not produced by inflationary expansion, might allow one to claim rep-
etition is necessarily occurring. This expanded complexity of our world can
be contrasted with the philosophy outlined by Wolfram [12] that the univer-
sal cellular automata has the same level of complexity as the whole universe.
Although it might take unreasonable amounts of runtime to calculate the
consequences. Note that unlike Wolfram we are not advocating here that
cellular automata necessarily describe all reality. We have doubts that, for
example, the “non-local” effects on quantum mechanics could adequately be
modelled, although some quantum like automata (complementarity games)
have been proposed [39].
Of course other reasons might still prefer the finite case, e.g. having
finite action or simplifying the boundary term for a “quantum creation”
calculation. One such finite model is the emergent universe [40], an update
of the Eddington-Lemaˆitre universe. We would just add that one motivation
for this model, that it maximizes the entropy does not seem correct. The
later inflationary state itself allows a higher entropy, and a Black hole with
the same mass produces even more [41,17].
We also argued against the notion that our universe could simply be the
inside of a computer existing within a larger universe. Whether the hypo-
thetical quantum computer alters any of these arguments is uncertain, but
the results of Wolpert [36], for example, already assume arbitrary fast pro-
cessing. The quantum computer is anyway likely to be limited by quantum
gravity cf.[42]
Let us return to the original motivation for the finite universe. The
argument is that there are only say N ∼ 1010
120
different possible universes of
the present visible horizon size. So if we took a random selection of N closed
universes of similar size to ours, or if our universe has N times more space
then we should expect repeats to start happening. Many of the properties
of these universes will be constrained by the Laws of Physics, and initial
conditions at the start of the universe. So many fewer actual alterations are
allowed by our own volition.
If the observable universe is growing many more regions are coming into
causal contact so allowing large extra numbers of possible quantum states.
This increase is likely to dominate over any possible changes i.e. like moving
objects, we might make. So this sort of reasoning actually ignores the effects
of human or any other life forms intervention - unless they start to develop
galactic scale alterations. The N possible universes are therefore effectively
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independent of life which is only a miniscule perturbation to the actual al-
lowed states. So any actual universe, say n, out of the N possibilities is
equally useful for our use. Human life which is so paramount to us is just
treated as extreme fine structure in this quantum state number argument
[4,9]. But by the same token it cannot then be applied to proscribe life if
this is what we are actually interested in cf.[7]. If the universe is actually
accelerating then the argument can be replaced that we should have only
negligible effect upon the growing entropy of the universe S = logW . In
fact the actual entropy of the visible universe is only ∼ 1090 -see for ex-
ample [38,41], considerably smaller than that given by the quantum state
calculation ∼ 10120 which is the maximum possible entropy allowed in the
visible universe. It is this low entropy that allows us to “play games” without
restricting their complexity.
If thermodynamical equilibrium was achieved then the behaviour would
then start to simply ergodically repeat states. So the repeat arguments
seem actually relevant to a system in thermodynamic equilibrium where life
anyway is not possible. It is then erroneous to try and conclude things
about life in this case. We have assumed a Copernican type principle so that
the Laws of Physics and initial conditions are closely similar. Other work
has considered the possibility of allowing an ensemble of different Laws or
Mathematics which would allow an even greater variety of possibilities -see
also [43,44].
It seems therefore that as long as our games have negligible effect upon
the universe it doesn’t matter whether we are in a finite or infinite universe.
Whether other life forms have exactly the same culture, music, sport etc.
as us depends on other arguments about how many varieties of such things
might be conceivable. But they are in the finer details of the universe. Ulti-
mately, the global topology will determine whether “games” can continue to
be played. For example if the universe continues accelerating it will reach a
stage of heat death with entropy maximized [17]. But again remaining in a
low entropy state and not the topology of the global universe is the dominant
factor.
In conclusion, we don’t feel the need to presently exclude infinite universes
necessarily for unwanted philosophical reasons. Or that infinite production
of inflationary universes would mean “anything in life” must happen some-
where. Admittedly this argument might be superseded by future results in
quantum gravity but not by the holography principle per se. This is for-
tunate since the universe regardless of size or state, leaves us with a blank
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canvas upon which to impose our own, to us important, values. In a sense
we are disconnected:1 the infinite universe isn’t some maelstrom dragging
everything, including life, in an ergodic fashion like atoms in a gas.
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